This paper argues that profi t-shifting activities exist for multi-jurisdictional enterprises (MJEs) under a tax system of consolidation and formula apportionment (FA). A theoretical model discusses how a MJE can exploit strategically its impact on the defi nition of the consolidated group. The analysis shows that the MJE will not consolidate if intra-group tax-rate differences -and thereby potential gains from profi t shifting -are large. We test this prediction using confi dential fi rm-level tax-return data for the local business tax in Germany. The identifi cation strategy exploits a quasi-experiment derived from a major company tax reform in 2001 that signifi cantly reduced the costs associated with separating out individual affi liates. Our results show that, evaluated at the sample mean, an increase in the tax-rate variance among a MJE's affi liates by one standard deviation reduces the number of consolidated affi liates by 20 percent.
I. INTRODUCTION
I n recent years, ongoing economic integration has led to a steep increase in the number of fi rms that operate in more than one tax jurisdiction. Consequently, the taxation of multi-jurisdictional entities (MJEs) has become an increasingly important policy issue as countries struggle with adjusting their tax systems to adapt corporate income taxation to multinational fi rms' activities. This is in particular true for Europe, where the European Commission (2001) proposed to replace the current system of multinational group taxation according to separate accounting (SA) rules with a common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) combined with a system of formula apportionment (FA). 1 decision. First, the exclusion of affi liates incurs non-consolidation costs. In addition to costs associated with a smaller degree of economic integration (agency costs), these costs include higher tax expenses since non-consolidation often prevents benefi ts from inter-fi rm loss offsets and creates double taxation problems. Lower non-consolidation costs make consolidation less likely. Second, the consolidation decision is infl uenced by the dispersion of statutory tax rates among the jurisdictions in which affi liates operate. A larger tax-rate spread makes it more attractive for the MJE to transfer taxable income from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions. Under SA, the MJE can shift paper profi ts to low-tax jurisdictions, e.g., by adjusting intra-fi rm transfer prices. Under FA, the MJE may gain from tax-rate differences if apportionment weights are affected by fi rm decisions, for instance, by relocating economic activity to low-tax jurisdictions. 5 But, even without those tax-induced distortions, the attractiveness of FA will be affected by the tax rate differential, depending on how much profi t is assigned to low-tax jurisdictions. If the gains from profi t-shifting under SA dominate the other effects, fi rms will fi nd non-consolidation more attractive with a larger tax-rate spread between the affi liates. In this case, it seems unlikely that FA is well suited to curb profi t-shifting since those MJEs that benefi t the most from profi t shifting due to large tax-rate differentials will decide not to consolidate. While it is an empirical question whether MJEs can more easily exploit tax arbitrage opportunities under SA than under FA, we argue that this is plausible, mainly because shifting paper profi ts is likely to be less costly than the relocation of real activities needed to affect the apportionment weights under FA.
In a second step, we test empirically whether this characterization of the strategic consolidation decision can be used to predict the observed structure of consolidated fi rms. Our testing ground is the German local business tax, which is levied at the municipal level. This tax contributes signifi cantly to the company tax burden in Germany, and the associated tax rates display substantial variation among the roughly 12,000 municipalities that levy the tax. If a MJE has affi liates in several municipalities, a FA scheme applies that consolidates group profi t and prescribes apportionment among the municipalities according to their shares in the MJE's total payroll. But similar to the U.S. case, at least in the time period analyzed below, the German FA scheme applies conditional on the appropriate legal, fi nancial, and economic ties between the entities. Since a group's ownership pattern as well as its economic and fi nancial connections are the outcomes of fi rm decisions, MJEs enjoy some discretion with regard to the consolidation of their affi liates and may thus -within certain boundaries -choose whether affi liates are subject to SA or FA regulations.
To identify the tax determinants of the MJEs' consolidation choices, we exploit a quasi-experiment that arises from a recent change in the German tax law associated with a comprehensive company tax reform in 2001. This reform signifi cantly reduced the costs associated with non-consolidation under the local business tax because loss-offset opportunities were improved and double taxation problems were reduced for unconsolidated fi rms. The reform therefore allows us to test whether, in fact, consolidated fi rms that face signifi cant profi t-shifting opportunities tend to reorganize in a way that is consistent with strategic choice of consolidation. The empirical results confi rm our theoretical predictions and suggest that the reduction in non-consolidation costs has intensifi ed tax planning in the form of restructuring businesses for groups with large shifting opportunities. Consistent with this view, after the 2001 reform, the German tax authorities faced increasing pressures to restrict profi t shifting at the sub-national level. In 2004 the federal legislature in Germany resorted to defi ning a minimum tax rate for the local business tax in order to restrict opportunities for profi t shifting to low-tax municipalities.
The empirical analysis employs a unique dataset that is comprised of confi dential tax return data for the whole population of fi rms subject to the German local business tax in the years 1998 and 2001. Exploiting these data, we show that MJEs with a large variation in tax rates across group affi liates signifi cantly reduced the number of consolidated affi liates between 1998 and 2001, relative to MJEs with a small variation in tax rates across group affi liates. This result is robust to the inclusion of various control variables characterizing the corporate group and the economic conditions in the hosting municipalities. Evaluated at the sample mean, we fi nd that an increase in the variation of the statutory tax rates by one standard deviation reduces the number of consolidated affi liates by 20 percent. This sizeable effect points to an important strategic component in the MJEs' consolidation decisions.
Our paper adds to two main strands of the economic literature. First, it contributes to the discussion of the pros and cons of different corporate taxation schemes for MJEs. The comparison of the economic effects of SA and FA goes back to early papers by McLure (1980) and Gordon and Wilson (1986) who show that FA may lead to distortions in fi rm behavior similar to SA. Recent papers by Anand and Sansing (2000) , Eggert and Schjelderup (2003) , Sørensen (2004) , Wellisch (2004) , Kind, Midelfart, and Schjelderup (2005) , Pethig and Wagener (2007) , Pinto (2007) , Riedel and Runkel (2007) , Eichner and Runkel (2008) , and Nielsen, Raimondos-Møller, and Schjelderup (2010) focus on the welfare implications of corporate taxation under SA and FA. Moreover, although the empirical evidence is still limited, recent years have seen the emergence of a literature that empirically quantifi es the distortions and economic effects of corporate taxation under FA. Examples are papers by Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) , Buettner (2003) , Mintz and Smart (2004) , Devereux and Loretz (2008), Fuest, Hemmelgarn, and Ramb (2007) and Riedel (2010) . Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, the existing literature has largely neglected the endogenous consolidation decision of MJEs. 6 Second, this article relates to a small literature that investigates how corporate taxation distorts the organizational structure of MJEs. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) analyze the determinants of partial ownership of foreign U.S. affi liates. Their evidence indicates that whole ownership is most common when fi rms benefi t from worldwide tax-planning opportunities. Weichenrieder and Mintz (2008) in turn provide evidence that MJEs alter their corporate organizational structures by using conduit and holding companies to reduce their corporate tax burden. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006) study tax incentives for MJEs' investments in tax havens. Huizinga and Voget (2009) show that ownership patterns within multinational entities are determined by profi t tax rates and withholding taxes. Bucovetsky and Haufl er (2008) discuss the consequences of preferential tax regimes for multinationals when fi rms can choose their multinational structure. However, this literature has not yet discussed the consolidation decision of MJEs under a formula apportionment taxation system.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the theoretical model underlying our estimation strategy, which is explained in detail in Section III. Section IV contains a description of the data and provides basic descriptive statistics. Section V outlines the estimation methodology, Section VI presents the results, and Section VII provides a summary.
II. A SIMPLE THEORETICAL MODEL
Consider a MJE with affi liates in two jurisdictions labeled by i ∈{a,b} 7 . The profi t of the affi liate in jurisdiction i is denoted by the random variable π i which takes the value π > 0 with probability p ∈[0,1] and -π < 0 with probability 1 -p. Hence, there are four states of the world for the MJE (Table 1) . It may make positive profi ts in both jurisdictions, it may realize positive profi t in jurisdiction a while making a loss in jurisdiction b and vice versa, or it may incur losses in both jurisdictions. In order to focus on the consolidation decision, we assume that the MJE has already decided on investment 7 Since our analysis focuses on source-based corporate taxation, it is irrelevant whether the headquarters of the MJE are located in jurisdiction a or jurisdiction b. 
and employment, so the probability distribution of π i is taken as given. 8 The MJE has discretion with regard to the inclusion of affi liates into a consolidated group. It can thus choose between FA taxation (consolidation) and SA taxation (no consolidation). In order to characterize this choice, we determine and compare the maximum expected after-tax profi t of the MJE under the two options.
A. Separate Accounting and Profi t Shifting
If the MJE does not consolidate, it is taxed according to the SA principle. It may then shift profi ts from one jurisdiction to the other. Typical channels of profi t shifting involve the manipulation of transfer prices in intra-fi rm trade, the use of internal debt, and the manipulation of the allocation of overhead costs (Devereux, 2006) . Since the specifi c channel of profi t shifting is immaterial for our purpose, we simply consider the total amount of profi t shifted, denoted by s. If s > 0, the MJE shifts profi t from jurisdiction a to jurisdiction b, while for s < 0, shifting takes place in the other direction. Profi t shifting is not costless to the MJE, as it incurs concealment costs denoted by C(s). These costs refl ect, for example, the MJE's expenses for tax lawyers or the risk of additional tax payments if the tax authorities successfully challenge transfer prices or other aspects of income attribution. The concealment cost function satisfi es C(0) = 0, sign{C ′(s)} = sign{s} and C ″(s) > 0, i.e., it is U-shaped with the minimum at the point where the MJE is not shifting profi ts.
While profi t shifting does not affect the probability distribution of profi ts depicted in Table 1 , it changes the reported profi ts of the affi liates. If the reported profi t in jurisdiction i is positive, it is taxed in this jurisdiction by a local business tax, where the tax rate is denoted by t i ∈ [0,1]. A negative reported profi t (i.e., a tax loss) is not taxed, and a part θ ∈[0,1] of it can be deducted from the tax base in the other jurisdiction (the inter-fi rm loss offset), provided the MJE reports a positive profi t there. For instance, if the MJE reports π -s > 0 in jurisdiction a and -π + s < 0 in jurisdiction b, tax payments are zero in jurisdiction b and t a [π -s + θ (-π + s)] in jurisdiction a. When the MJE incurs losses in both jurisdictions, tax payments are zero in both jurisdictions.
We focus on the case where profi t shifting does not change the sign of the affi liates' reported earnings, i.e., s ∈[-π, π], so that if the MJE earns a positive profi t π in a jurisdiction, profi t shifting does not result in a reported loss. Moreover, in case of a loss -π, the MJE's shifting does not result in reporting a positive profi t. A suffi cient condition for s ∈[-π, π] is that concealment costs are not too low. 9 The MJE's expected after-tax profi t with SA taxation can then be written as
s π ( ( 8 Endogenizing the investment and labor choices of the MJE would complicate the analysis without yielding further insights. For instance, suppose the profi t of an affi liate is given by π (k,l ) = X(k,l ) -rk -wl where X is the production function, k and l are capital and labor input, and r and w are the factor prices. It can then be shown that our results remain qualitatively unchanged. 9 For example, it can be shown that with quadratic concealment costs C(s) = β s 2 /2 with β > 0, there always exists a β such that the MJE chooses s ∈ [-π,π] if β > β -.
which equals the after-tax profi t/loss in the four different states of the world, weighted by the probabilities of these states, less concealment costs. Under SA taxation, the MJE maximizes the expected after-tax profi t (1) with respect to profi t shifting s. From the fi rst-order condition π′ s (s) = 0, we obtain
According to (2), the MJE shifts profi t up to the point where the expected marginal gain from profit shifting in terms of the tax-rate differential (LHS) just equals the marginal concealment costs (RHS). This condition determines optimal profi t shifting as a function of the tax-rate differential, i.e.
As is intuitively plausible, an increase in the tax-rate differential in absolute terms induces the MJE to shift more profi t between the two jurisdictions. Substituting the optimal amount of shifting S(t a -t b ) into (1) yields the maximum expected after-tax profi t under SA taxation. Using (2) and rearranging yields
]. According to (3), the maximum expected after-tax profi t under SA consists of four components. The term 2π (2p -1) represents the expected maximum profi t before taxes, loss-offset, and profi t shifting. From this profi t we have to subtract the expected tax payments before profi t shifting and loss-offset, T S (t a ,t b ), and the additional tax payments due to restricted loss-offset, L(θ ). Finally, we have to add F(t a -t b ) which represents the net gain from profi t shifting. Note that the properties of C and S imply F(0) = 0, F(t a -t b ) > 0 if t a -t b ≠ 0 and F′(·) = S(·) S ′(·)C″[·] < = > 0 if and only if t a -t b < = > 0. Hence, an increase in the tax-rate differential in absolute terms raises the MJE's net gain from profi t shifting.
B. Formula Apportionment and Formula Distortion
If the MJE consolidates its affi liates, profi t is taxed according to the FA principle. The pre-tax profi t is fi rst consolidated and then apportioned to the two jurisdictions according to a formula. Note that consolidation implies full loss offset. 10 Moreover, the MJE's profi t-shifting incentive is eliminated since the consolidated tax base is independent of profi t shifting. Hence, under FA taxation, the MJE chooses s = 0 and thereby C(0) = 0. However, from the previous literature discussed in Section I, it is known that the apportionment mechanism may distort production decisions, depending on the defi nition of the apportionment factors. With capital and labor input as apportionment factors, for instance, the MJE may alter its production decisions by investing more capital and employing more labor in the low-tax jurisdiction than in the high-tax jurisdiction since, by doing so, it affects the formula weights and thus effectively allocates a larger part of the consolidated tax base to the low-tax jurisdiction, which reduces its tax burden. Since this tax distortion only arises under FA taxation, we refer to it as the formuladistortion.
To capture the formula-distortion incentive, albeit in a stylized way, we assume that the MJE directly chooses the shares of the consolidated tax base assigned to the two jurisdictions. For simplicity, we maintain the above assumption that the underlying distribution of profi ts is symmetric so that expected profi ts are identical at the two affi liates. Let the share of (pre-tax) profi ts assigned to jurisdiction a be denoted by α ∈[0,1]. Consequently, jurisdiction b receives a share of 1 -α. The share α chosen by the MJE may differ from the "true" share α -∈[0,1], i.e., the share of (pre-tax) profi ts apportioned to jurisdiction a in a hypothetical situation in which the MJE is not subject to taxation. For example, if payroll is the only apportionment factor and if, in the absence of taxation, the MJE uses less (more) labor in jurisdiction a than in jurisdiction b, then α -< 0.5 (α -> 0.5). If both affi liates have the same payroll costs in the absence of taxation, we obtain α -= 0.5. When taxation is introduced, the MJE may relocate input factors and hence choose α to differ from αin order to reduce its tax burden. This is the formula-distortion incentive of the MJE. Deviation is not costless, however, since relocating input factors distorts the MJE's production decision. These distortion costs are denoted by D(α -α -) with D(0) = 0, sign{D′(α -α -)} = sign{α -α -} and D″(α -α -) > 0, i.e., the distortion costs are U-shaped with the minimum at the point where the MJE is not distorting the apportionment formula.
The consolidated tax base is 2π with probability p 2 , zero with probability 2p(1 -p), and -2π with probability (1 -p) 2 . The MJE's expected after-tax profi t under consolidation is thus
The MJE maximizes (4) with respect to the apportionment share α. From the fi rst-order condition π ′ f (α ) = 0, we obtain
Condition (5) states that the optimal formula-distortion equates the expected marginal gain in terms of the tax-rate differential (LHS) and the marginal distortion costs (RHS). This condition determines the MJE's optimal deviation from the true apportionment share as a function of the tax-rate differential. Formally, we can write
< 0. Thus, the MJE distorts its factor allocation such that a larger share of the consolidated tax base is allocated to the low-tax jurisdiction, and the incentive to do so increases with the tax-rate differential (in absolute terms). Inserting A(t a -t b ) into (4) and rearranging yields the maximum expected after-tax profi t under FA taxation
The maximum expected after-tax profi t (6) consists of three components. The term 2π(2p -1) represents the expected profi t before taxes and the formula-distortion and is the same as under SA. From this before-tax profi t, we have to subtract tax payments before the formula distortion, T f (t a ,t b ), and add the net gain from distorting the apportionment formula,
Hence, an increase in the tax-rate differential in absolute terms raises the net gain from formula-distortion.
C. Consolidation Decision
In order to characterize the MJE's consolidation decision, we have to take into account the maximum expected after-tax profi t under SA and FA in (3) and (6). Moreover, the MJE is assumed to incur additional costs γ > 0 if it does not consolidate the affi liates. These non-consolidation costs refl ect the costs of operating an affi liate as a separate entity for tax purposes. For example, in the institutional context of the empirical analysis below, the MJE would have to change the organizational, economic, and fi nancial integration of the fi rms. As a consequence, agency costs with regard to the management of the affi liates may arise. Another example of non-consolidation costs is possible double taxation under SA; we provide some examples in the empirical analysis below. 11 Overall, the MJE will not consolidate if and only if π s * -γ > π f * or, equivalently, if
The function H can be interpreted as the expected net gain from non-consolidation. It equals the gain from profi t shifting under SA (F) less the additional tax payments due to the restricted loss-offset under SA (L), the non-consolidation costs under SA (γ ), the gain from formula distortion under FA (G), and a term Δ(t a -t b ) that refl ects the difference in tax payments under the two tax methods. The last term indicates a possible selection effect of FA. To illustrate this, consider an example where, despite equal profi ts, the MJE has a lower true apportionment share in jurisdiction a (α -< 0.5). If jurisdiction a is the high-tax jurisdiction (t a > t b ), then the MJE has a further incentive to opt for consolidation since this reduces the tax payments even without distorting the formula (Δ > 0). If jurisdiction a is the low-tax jurisdiction (t a < t b ), the opposite applies, and the MJE has a reduced incentive to opt for consolidation (Δ < 0). Partial differentiation of (7) yields 12
From (8), we immediately obtain the following result.
Proposition. Consolidation of the MJE is less likely (1) the lower the non-consolidation costs γ;
(2) the more generous the loss-offset opportunities θ available without consolidation; and (3) the larger the tax-rate differential t a -t b in absolute terms, provided
The intuition underlying parts (1) and (2) of this proposition is obvious. The lower the direct non-consolidation costs γ, the higher is the net gain from non-consolidation (H) and the less likely is consolidation of the affi liates. A larger value of θ reduces the limitation of loss-offset opportunities under SA taxation and thereby reduces the gap to complete loss offset under FA taxation. Hence, the net gain from non-consolidation (H) increases and it becomes less likely that the MJE will consolidate the two affi liates.
According to part (3) of the proposition, the impact of the tax-rate differential t at b on the MJE's consolidation decision depends on the relative magnitudes of three effects. First, if the tax-rate differential increases in absolute terms, the net gain from profi t shifting under SA taxation (F) goes up and increases the net benefi t from nonconsolidation (H). Second, a higher tax-rate differential in absolute terms also raises the net gain from formula distortion under FA taxation (G), and thus lowers the net gain from non-consolidation (H). Third, if the true apportionment share is lower in the hightax jurisdiction (t a > t b and α -< 0.5, or t a < t b and α -> 0.5), an increase in the tax-rate differential raises the benefi t from the selection effect of consolidation (Δ) described above and thereby reduces the net gain from non-consolidation (H). If the gain from profi t shifting reacts more sensitively to changes in the tax-rate differential than the gain from formula distortion and the benefi t from the selection effect, i.e., |F ′| > |G ′ + Δ ′|, the total effect on the net gain of non-consolidation (H) is positive. Under this condition, if the tax-rate differential rises, it becomes more attractive to opt against consolidation and to exploit profi t-shifting opportunities offered by the SA regime.
The validity of the condition |F ′| > |G ′ + Δ ′| is an empirical question. It is often argued that the reallocation of profi t is substantially easier via the shifting of paper profi ts under SA than via changing the apportionment factors under FA, which requires a relocation of real economic activity (i.e., |F ′| > |G ′|). Mintz and Smart (2004) present empirical evidence consistent with this view. Their analysis for the Canadian corporate tax system suggests that the tax bases of fi rms that are taxed according to SA react more sensitively to corporate tax-rate changes than the tax bases of fi rms that are taxed according to FA. This is also likely to hold true in our empirical setting, as many low-tax municipalities in Germany are located in remote areas with inferior labor market access and poor infrastructure. Thus, the advantage of profi t shifting strategies under SA is that it allows the transfer of profi ts to tax haven municipalities while production locations can remain in agglomeration centres that commonly charge high local business tax rates. Under FA with payroll apportionment, the MJE, in contrast, has to shift a signifi cant part of its work force to low-tax jurisdictions in order to reduce its corporate tax burden which -despite low property prices -is likely to be associated with signifi cant costs due to forgone benefi ts from labor market access, proximity to other companies (i.e., benefi ts from technological spillovers), and inferior infrastructure.
The condition stated in the proposition also hinges on the selection effect. If the selection effect favors consolidation (Δ > 0) then, because more weight is attached to low-tax locations since Δ′ > 0, it is possible that fi rms with large tax-rate differentials fi nd it more attractive to opt for consolidation. If we observe empirically that fi rms facing large tax-rate differentials opt for non-consolidation, we can infer that the gains from profi t shifting outweigh the gains from manipulating the apportionment factors under FA (|F ′| > |G ′|). Provided the gains from formula distortion dominate the selection effect, this also holds if the selection effect works against consolidation, Δ < 0. While this depends on the actual formula weights used for the apportionment, we argue that in the specifi c case we analyze below, if a general selection effect exists, it is more likely to favour consolidation (Δ > 0 and Δ′ > 0).
III. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND INVESTIGATION APPROACH
To test the predictions of the theoretical model, we investigate local business taxation in Germany, which applies FA principles to the taxation of multi-jurisdictional fi rms. The local business tax is levied autonomously by German municipalities while the tax law that defi nes the tax base is determined at the national level. Moreover, tax administration is assigned to the state level. Thus, local autonomy is confi ned to setting the tax rate. The tax is levied on all income that is considered to be business income under the income tax, regardless of whether it accrues to incorporated or unincorporated fi rms. Corporations and individuals are subject to local business taxation if they operate a permanent establishment in a municipality. If corporations or individuals run several establishments or branches, which may or may not be located in other municipalities, business income is consolidated. The income of separate entities with their own legal status is consolidated if three criteria are fulfi lled: (1) an entity is owned with a direct majority, (2) it is integrated in the hierarchical organization of the group, and (3) it has an economic relationship to the group's business. Once taxable income is determined, the tax base is then apportioned among all municipalities according to the payroll shares in the municipalities.
The local business tax burden on the tax base allocated to a municipality is determined by the municipality's business tax rate. This tax rate is measured in local business "tax points" and varies substantially between municipalities ranging from zero to 900 points in our data set, with an average of 325 points. To calculate a fi rm's actual tax rate, the municipality's local business tax points are divided by 100 and multiplied by the base tax rate of 5 percent. Thus, the average rate amounts to 16.25 percent (= 325/100*0.05). Taking into account the self-deductibility of the business tax, the resulting statutory tax rate on profi ts (ignoring the corporation tax) in 2001 varied between zero and 31 percent, with a mean of about 14 percent. 13 The tax base essentially corresponds to the fi rm's annual profi ts as defi ned for purposes of the corporation tax, but there are some important additions; most notably, 50 percent of interest payments (excluding shortterm debt) are added to the local business tax base.
To relate the empirical analysis to our theoretical model, we have to clarify how the determinants of the consolidation decision identifi ed in the above proposition work under the German local business tax. Consider fi rst the dispersion of tax rates (t a -t b in the model). Due to the inclusion of interest payments in the tax base, profi t shifting between unconsolidated affi liates by means of internal debt is quite costly. However, at least until 2008, other payments between affi liates such as license fees/royalties or intermediate inputs have not been taxed, and thus offer ample opportunities to exploit tax-rate differences for profi t shifting. Indeed, restricting profi t shifting between unconsolidated affi liates was the basic motivation for implementing group taxation in Germany in 1906, and has been supported by the highest courts continuously (e.g., Bundesfi nanzhof, 1990) . With group status, the profi ts of an MJE are apportioned according to the payroll of the branches and subsidiaries. Hence, in order to reduce the effective tax burden under FA, a MJE needs to relocate payroll to low-tax jurisdictions. While this is certainly possible, it might be rather costly as it is the actual location of the work place of each individual worker that matters for apportionment -it is not suffi cient to issue payment at another location (Lenski and Steinberg, 2009 ). Thus, even though MJEs may to some extent engage in manipulating the location of factors that serve as apportionment weights under the German local business tax, this is likely to be more costly than shifting paper profi ts between unconsolidated affi liates (which implies |F ′| > |G ′| in the theoretical model). Thus, given the defi nition of formula weights, if a general selection effect exists in the German case, it is likely to be positive. To see why, note that with weights based on payroll a positive selection effect arises if more profi table activities are carried out in the jurisdictions with higher tax rates. Since local tax rates in Germany are closely associated with population size and density (Buettner, 2001; Koh and Riedel, 2010) , and since densely populated jurisdictions tend to host the more profi table headquarters activities as well as R&D, the selection effect is likely to be positive and increasing in the tax rate differential. 13 The self-deductibility of the local business tax implies that the tax payment T is calculated as T = t(π -T), with t denoting the local business tax rate (in percentage values) and π denoting the company profi ts. Rearranging yields T = t/(1 + t)π. Hence, the statutory local business tax rate that is implied by a local business tax of 16.25 percent, for example, is 0.1625/1.1625 = 14 percent.
Analogously to other FA systems and consistent with the basic presumption of our theoretical model, MJEs under the German local business tax have some discretion with regard to a consolidation decision. As mentioned above, in the period under consideration, the legal group defi nition relies on three separate but related criteria: (1) majority ownership; (2) a hierarchical organization; and (3) some economic relationship. In order to avoid group status, it is suffi cient for a multijurisdictional entity to fail to meet one of the three criteria. For instance, since the ownership criterion requires that the dependent affi liate be held with a direct majority, group status could be avoided if the affi liate were indirectly held. The separate entity would then not be considered as being fi nancially integrated even if it is held indirectly. Another option for avoiding group status would be to change the organizational structure such that the board of the separated entity has discretion with regard to business decisions. A third option would be to sever economic relations with the entity, although whether this is feasible depends on the specifi cs of the fi rm.
Even if group status can easily be avoided, operating separate affi liates under the German local business tax nevertheless incurs costs. For example, it may reduce the effi ciency of management processes and increase agency costs with regard to the management of the separated affi liates. Such costs correspond to the parameter γ in our model. Moreover, separating out affi liates implies that there is no direct inter-fi rm loss offset for tax purposes, i.e., a loss of one affi liate cannot be offset against the profi t of another affi liate. This disadvantage is exacerbated by the link between the group defi nition for the purpose of local business taxation and the group defi nition for the purpose of the German corporation income tax which is levied at the federal level. 14 Before 2000, the criteria for group taxation with regard to the federal corporation tax were the same as with regard to the business tax, except that a profi t-transfer agreement also needed to be signed. 15 As a consequence, a reorganization of the fi rm to avoid group status for the local business tax implied that no group status and hence no loss offset could be obtained under the federal corporation tax. Since the federal corporation tax accounted for about two-thirds of the total effective tax rate on corporate profi ts in Germany in 2001, this non-consolidation for purposes of the federal corporation tax imposed signifi cant costs on MJEs. In addition, until 2000, expenses related to tax-exempt activities were not deductible without group status. Lacking group status also limits the ability to avoid transfer taxes such as the real estate transfer tax (Herrmann, Heuer, and Raupach, 2001) . In a stylized way, the tax costs of non-consolidation due to limitations on loss offsets and double taxation are captured by θ and γ in our model.
Against this background, the empirical analysis exploits an exogenous variation in the German tax law that signifi cantly lowered non-consolidation costs and thus increased the net gain from operating separate affi liates. In 2001, the German government 14 With a statutory rate of 25 percent and a surcharge of 5.5 percent, the effective corporation tax rate is about 26.4 percent. Assuming the municipality sets the statutory rate of the local business tax at 20 percent, which was typical for German cities in 2001, and taking into account the deductibility of the local business tax, the total tax rate is 38.5 percent. 15 A profi t transfer agreement regulates the relationship between a parent fi rm and its subsidiary. The subsidiary places itself under the control of the parent fi rm and agrees to transfer its total profi t to the parent.
implemented a broad company tax reform. Although the reform did not directly alter the consolidation rules for the purposes of the local business tax, the rules governing group status with regard to the federal corporation tax were signifi cantly altered. The new rule defi ning corporation tax group status is characterized by a simple ownership requirement, including indirect participation and a profi t transfer agreement. This has created a situation where MJEs have considerable freedom to select group status (Krebs, 2001) since they now can decide separately whether to consolidate a fi rm for the purpose of the local business tax and the federal corporation tax (Kirsch and Grube, 2001) . 16 By allowing the fi rm to keep group status for purposes of the corporation tax, the 2001 reform signifi cantly decreased the costs of separating some affi liates from the rest of the group for purposes of the local business tax. The MJE may reap tax savings from separate assessment of affi liates for local business tax purposes by exploiting profi tshifting opportunities. However, this separate assessment does not automatically imply that the MJE has to forgo the benefi ts of group taxation under the federal corporation tax.
In terms of our formal model, the reform not only lowered the non-consolidation costs γ but also increased the loss-offset parameter θ. Hence, in line with the results of the theoretical analysis, we predict that the reform increased the MJEs' incentives to exclude affi liates for local tax purposes, and that this behavioral response is likely to be especially important for groups facing a large dispersion of statutory local tax rates.
IV. DATA SET AND SAMPLE STATISTICS
We test for strategic consolidation using a unique dataset provided by the German Statistical Offi ces at the federal and state levels. The data contain information from confi dential tax returns for the whole population of German companies that are subject to local business taxation. The information is gathered directly from German tax authorities and is available for the years 1998 and 2001. 17 The dataset includes information about the capital stock, payroll, industry, multijurisdictional status (multi-jurisdictional versus uni-jurisdictional fi rms), legal form (incorporated versus unincorporated fi rms), taxable profi ts, and the characteristics of the fi rms' hosting locations. Since we are interested in investigating tax effects on the MJEs' consolidation decisions, we restrict our attention to entities that operate affi liates (i.e., branches or separate entities that are considered to be part of the same corporate group) in several municipalities and are therefore subject to FA regulations. One major advantage of the data is that they allow us to identify all group affi liates that are consolidated. To determine tax effects on the number of consolidated affi liates between 1998 and 2001, we restrict attention to MJEs for which data are available in both sample years. The resulting dataset covers 50,342 groups. 18 Table 2 presents basic sample statistics for the corporate groups in our dataset. In 1998, the average number of affi liates that are consolidated under FA rules is 4.1 for the MJEs in our data set. Between 1998 and 2001, this number increases by 0.11. Calculating the average growth rate in the number of consolidated affi liates for the same time period yields a fi gure of 5.47 percent. The positive average trend in fi rm numbers possibly refl ects a host of different trends in the German economy. This includes the macroeconomic performance of the German economy, structural changes in industry composition, and business cycle effects. Moreover, the growth rate in the number of consolidated affi liates varies considerably across the groups in our sample because, fi rst, almost 50 percent of the MJEs report a non-zero change in their number of consolidated affi liates and, second, the standard deviations reported in Table 2 also suggest considerable differences in the quantitative magnitude of the changes in fi rm numbers across observations.
Our theoretical discussion suggests that, given the decline in non-consolidation costs, the rate of growth in the number of affi liates should be inversely related to the variation in the local business tax rates across affi liates, since this determines the potential gains from profi t shifting. To measure the variation of the statutory tax rates, we employ two alternative indicators. First, we calculate the variance of the distribution of local business tax rates within each multi-jurisdictional group prior to the reform in 1998. The average variance measure in local business tax points is 950.35 and exhibits considerable variation across groups. Second, we calculate the ratio of the business tax points at the 90th percentile of the group's tax distribution to the business tax points at the 10th percentile of the group's tax distribution in 1998. The average of this measure amounts to 1.15 and indicates that the tax rate at the 90th percentile exceeds the tax rate at the 10th percentile by about 15 percent. 19 We control for the characteristics of the groups' hosting municipalities as well as for several fi rm characteristics. The sample statistics for these variables are also 18 The cross sections for 1998 and 2001 are linked by the respective group's tax account identifi er which may potentially change over time, mainly in the course of tax offi ce restructuring or headquarters relocations to other jurisdictions or, in larger cities, relocation to other quarters. While this reduces the sample size, it mainly constitutes random sample selection that is innocuous for our analysis. 19 Measuring the tax-rate spread within the group by the variance or the above-described percentile ratio are two alternative ways to provide a multi-affi liate analog to the absolute tax-rate differential in the twoaffi liate case that was used in the theoretical model.
presented in Table 2 . The hosting municipalities' characteristics are based on data from the German Statistical Offi ces' REGIOSTAT database. We calculate unweighted average values for the number of inhabitants, the number of employees, and the average unemployment rate for municipalities of the MJEs' affi liates in 1998. Notes: (1) DM is the abbreviation for "Deutsche Mark," the German currency prior to the introduction of the euro. The Deutsche Mark to euro exchange rate is approximately two to one.
the MJEs' consolidated affi liates with respect to size, profi tability, and apportionment shares. Analogous to measuring the intra-group tax-rate distribution, we employ two measures, the variance and the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile of the intra-fi rm distribution, to capture how the capital stock, pre-tax profi ts, relative payroll shares, and capital intensities vary across group affi liates in 1998. Since the variance calculation exhibits similar fi ndings, Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the 90/10 ratio only. The 90/10 ratio of the affi liates' capital stock points to considerable heterogeneity among affi liates. A similar picture emerges with regard to the variation of pre-tax profi ts, relative payroll shares, and capital intensities in 1998. All reported ratios are large and suggest heterogeneity across affi liates in the respective dimensions.
V. ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY
We now assess empirically whether -as suggested by our theory -a large variation in statutory tax rates across multi-jurisdictional affi liates is indeed associated with a tendency to exclude affi liates from consolidation in 2001, when the cost of non-consolidation decreased substantially. Formally, we estimate the following model
where n i depicts the growth rate in the number of consolidated affi liates of MJE i between 1998 and 2001, and v i symbolizes the intra-fi rm corporate tax-rate variation in 1998, measured either by the group's tax-rate variance in 1998 or the ratio of the business tax rate at the 90th percentile of the intra-fi rm tax distribution in 1998 to the business tax rate at the 10th percentile. Our theoretical model predicts that MJEs with a higher tax rate spread have a larger incentive to de-consolidate affi liates from the group in order to exploit profi t shifting opportunities, and hence we expect β 1 < 0. The effect of profi t shifting is thus identifi ed by comparing, in the year after the tax reform, MJEs with a relatively large tax-rate spread to MJEs with a relatively small tax-rate spread. Technically speaking, the former fi rms constitute the treatment group and are predicted to have a stronger tendency to de-consolidate affi liates than the control group where the tax-rate spread is smaller. This identifi cation strategy presupposes that the tax-rate spread in 1998 is uncorrelated to unobserved group characteristics that may affect the change in the number of consolidated affi liates. We consider that to be very likely, as the analysis includes a large set of control variables that absorb effects related to industry, fi rm size, profi tability, capital intensity, and other factors (see below). Note moreover that our investigative approach focuses on the multi-jurisdictional group. It does not attempt to predict how the reorganization of the group actually takes place. Given our theoretical result that the tax-rate differential captures the size of possible gains from profi t shifting, we might, for instance, expect that affi liates whose tax rate signifi cantly deviates from the group mean would have a higher probability of being separated from the group. However, the separation decision will also depend on the specifi c cost of using separate accounting as well as on the cost of profi t shifting. Moreover, it should be noted that the empirical variation that can be used to shed light on tax planning with regard to group status is at the level of the group rather than at the level of the individual affi liate. In other words, the decisions on whether to separate individual affi liates from group consolidation are hardly independent. We therefore restrict the analysis to the group level.
Our analysis controls for several group characteristics. We include the number of affi liates n i that are consolidated under FA regulations in 1998, as well as various other variables that may exert an infl uence on the growth rate of the number of consolidated group affi liates. Since size and profi tability may be important, we include each group's stock of capital, profi tability, and capital intensity in 1998 as control variables. To account for structural differences between groups, we include a full set of industry dummies at the two-digit NACE level 20 and dummies for different legal forms (individual fi rms, non-incorporated fi rms, and incorporated fi rms).
Moreover, we control for the average characteristics of the MJEs' hosting municipalities as described in the previous section. These variables capture some characteristics at the local or regional level that might be correlated with the changes in the numbers of consolidated affi liates. Finally, it seems reasonable to control for variation in other fi rm characteristics across subsidiaries to test whether the estimated effect simply picks up other types of heterogeneity among affi liates. Thus, we include control variables in our estimation equation for the variation in the affi liates' relative payroll share in 1998, as well as for the variation in capital stock, pre-tax profi ts, and capital intensity in 1998. The calculation of these measures of variation thereby follows the calculation methodology for the tax-rate variable, i.e., we calculate the variance of the measures across group affi liates and the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile of the variables' intra-group distribution.
In our baseline regression, we estimate (9) based on OLS methodology. However, although a relatively large fraction (almost 50 percent) of the MJEs report a change in the number of consolidated affi liates, the majority of these groups have a variation of only one consolidated affi liate, and less than 10 percent of these groups have a change of two or more. 21 This suggests that we should check whether the results are robust to the use of an alternative limited-dependent variable model. Hence, as a robustness check, we also construct a categorical variable that depicts whether the number of affi liates has increased, stayed constant, or declined, and then perform the analysis again using an ordered probit model.
VI. RESULTS
This section presents our estimation results. For all regressions the unit of observation is the multi-jurisdictional group. Table 3 displays the results of our baseline OLS regression.
The tax-rate variation v i is captured by the variance across consolidated group affi liates in specifi cations (1) to (4) and by the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile of a group's tax-rate distribution in specifi cations (5) to (8). Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coeffi cient estimates. Specifi cation (1) regresses the growth rate in the number of consolidated affi liates on the group's tax-rate variance and control variables for the number of consolidated group affi liates in 1998, the groups' legal form, a full set of industry fi xed effects, and a dummy variable that indicates so-called integrated corporate groups that do not only comprise branches but also incorporated affi liates. As predicted by our theory, the variance of the statutory tax rates exerts a signifi cantly negative infl uence on the number of consolidated affi liates. Evaluated at the sample mean, the coeffi cient estimate suggests that an increase in the tax variance measure by one standard deviation reduces the growth rate of the number of consolidated affi liates by 21.7 percent. 22 Specifi cation (2) adds additional control variables for the group's size, productivity, and capital intensity. Larger corporate groups (measured in terms of the total capital stock) display a higher growth rate of affi liate numbers. Moreover, the larger the group profi t, the larger is the growth rate in affi liate numbers. In contrast, a high capital intensity is associated with a decline in the number of affi liates. The inclusion of these control characteristics renders the coeffi cient estimate for the number of consolidated affi liates in 1998 negative and statistically signifi cant, suggesting that corporations with a larger number of affi liates increase the number of affi liates at a lower rate, all else equal. This might indicate that group level variables such as profi ts matter relative to the number of fi rms involved, or it might just refl ect a stochastic mean-reversion effect. Specifi cation (3) further controls for differences in local economic conditions, employing averages of the hosting jurisdictions' characteristics. Only the coeffi cient estimate for the average employment variable suggests a marginally signifi cant positive infl uence on the growth rate of the number of affi liates, as the coeffi cient estimates for the other control variables remain statistically insignifi cant. At any rate, though, the inclusion of the additional controls does not affect the estimate of the coeffi cient for the tax-rate variance, which remains statistically signifi cant, suggesting that an increase in the variance of the tax rate by one standard deviation reduces the growth rate of the number of consolidated affi liates by 22.4 percent. 22 An increase in the tax variance by one standard deviation (= 1,631.8, Table 2 ) reduces the growth rate of the number of consolidated affi liates by 1.18 percentage points (= 1,631.8*0.0726/10,000; see specifi cation (1) of Table 3 ). Relative to the average growth rate in the number of consolidated affi liates of (= 5.47 percent, Table 1 ), this corresponds to a reduction of 21.7 percent. In specifi cation (4) we check whether the coeffi cient for the variance of the tax rate simply picks up variation of other fi rm characteristics like size or profi tability that may be correlated with the variation of tax rates across affi liates as well as with the growth rate in the group's number of consolidated affi liates. We also include a measure of the variance of payroll shares, which might affect consolidation decisions if a selection effect exists. The results suggest that the variance in affi liate size exerts a signifi cant positive effect on the growth rate of the number of consolidated affi liates. This indicates that groups which consist of rather heterogeneous affi liates in terms of size in 1998 are more likely to increase the number of consolidated affi liates. The coeffi cient estimate for the variance in affi liate profi ts exhibits a statistically signifi cant negative effect. This might indicate that with a strong variation in profi tability between affi liates in 1998, a MJE may have an incentive to shut down the relatively unprofi table subsidiaries. However, an alternative explanation, in line with the theoretical model presented above, is that MJEs that had a relatively large variance of profi ts but avoided separate accounting before the reform to take advantage of the possibility of loss offset are now re-organizing. This directly translates into a reduction in the growth rate of affi liate numbers. A similar explanation applies to the negative signifi cant effect of the variation in the affi liates' capital intensity. However, the coeffi cient estimate for the variation of the tax rates again remains stable and statistically signifi cant. Evaluated at the sample mean, the coeffi cient estimate suggests that an increase in the tax variance measure by one standard deviation reduces the affi liate growth rate by 22.8 percent. 23 To check whether our results are robust to alternative measures of the tax-rate distribution, we re-estimate the specifi cations employing the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile of a group's tax-rate distribution. Large values of this tax measure imply greater variation in the tax-rate distribution within the corporate group in 1998 and should result in a lower growth rate in the number of affi liates. This presumption is strongly confi rmed by the results for specifi cation (5) of Table 3 . The coeffi cient estimate for the measure of the tax-rate dispersion is negative and statistically signifi cant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that an increase in this indicator by one standard deviation reduces the growth rate of the number of consolidated affi liates by 15 percent. Specifi cations (6) to (8) show that this result is robust to the inclusion of the control variables employed above, which have the same signs as previously. The coeffi cient estimate in specifi cation (8) indicates that an increase in the tax-rate dispersion measure by one standard 23 While the F-test for the joint signifi cance of the variables is highly signifi cant at the 1 percent signifi cance level in all specifi cations, the R-squared values are rather small. This indicates that a large fraction of the variation in the growth rate of the number of consolidated affi liates is explained by (fi rm-specifi c) factors not captured by our model. The small R-squared values may also point to lumpiness of the dependent variable. Nevertheless, given previous studies, we are not too concerned about this issue, since low R-squared values in regression equations are very common in the literature, especially for cross-sectional analysis. Moreover, the potential problem of a large error variance relative to the variance of the dependent variable is offset by the large sample size in our model specifi cations. Furthermore, it is widely acknowledged that empirical analyses should focus on the theoretical relevance of the explanatory variables to the dependent variable and their statistical signifi cance rather than the R-squared statistic (Wooldridge, 2009 ). deviation reduces the growth rate of affi liate numbers by 20.7 percent. 24 Thus, the estimated effect is quantitatively close to the effect found using the tax variance measure. 25 As described above, we re-estimated our regressions in an ordered probit framework where the dependent variable takes on three values: "affi liate number decreased" (= 1), "affi liate number stayed constant" (= 2), and "affi liate number increased" (= 3). The results are presented in Table 4 where the local business tax rate variation across group affi liates is captured by the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile of the tax distribution (employing the local business tax variance leads to comparable results).
Specifi cations (1) to (4) resemble the estimations presented in Table 3 and confi rm the previous results in the sense that the dispersion measure exerts a statistically signifi cant negative impact on the change in affi liate numbers. We also experimented with alternative categorizations of the dependent variable (e.g., the use of fi ve categories) and obtained comparable results. To save space, the corresponding results are not presented here, but are available from the authors upon request.
We conclude from our empirical analysis that the evidence supports our theoretical prediction. MJEs experiencing a large variation in the tax-rate distribution among affi liates are found to have reduced the number of consolidated affi liates compared with MJEs with a low variation of tax rates across affi liates. This corresponds to the view that the former groups can generate larger profi t-shifting gains under non-consolidation, and therefore reduced the numbers of their consolidated affi liates to a greater extent in response to the change in German tax law in 2001.
VII. SUMMARY
While SA rules govern the taxation of multinational enterprises in the current system of international taxation, these rules are often criticized as giving rise to profi t-shifting opportunities. As an alternative, a FA system of profi t consolidation and apportionment has been suggested in the literature and in the policy arena, primarily on the grounds that group-wide consolidation is believed to eliminate profi t-shifting incentives. However, our paper shows that profi t-shifting incentives remain important under FA. We argue that a particular problem faced under FA is that profi t shifting within the corporate group is eliminated only if all group affi liates of a MJE are consolidated. Since the rules that determine the consolidated group usually depend on the degree of economic and fi nancial integration which ultimately refl ect fi rm decisions, MJEs will have some fl exibility in deciding whether their affi liates are included in the consolidated group. As a result, consolidation becomes a strategic tax planning tool for a MJE.
To analyze strategic consolidation, we develop a theoretical model of a MJE that operates affi liates in different jurisdictions and deternines whether to consolidate these affi liates. Within this model, we identify the basic trade-off involved in the consolidation decision. On the one hand, exclusion of affi liates has costs, notably, loss-offset opportunities that cannot be exploited and the possibility of double-taxation. On the other hand, non-consolidation has the benefi t of maintaining profi t-shifting opportunities. This benefi t, and thus the incentive for non-consolidation of affi liates, increases in importance as the dispersion of statutory tax rates within the whole corporate group increases. Provided that the net gain from profi t shifting is larger than the net gain from manipulating apportionment shares and the selection effect under formula apportionment, we expect that consolidation is more likely if the tax-rate differential is small and if the costs of non-consolidation, including those arising from incomplete loss offset, are high.
The empirical analysis provides evidence that MJEs that are taxed according to FA do, in fact, strategically exclude affi liates from consolidation. The analysis uses a unique fi rm-level data set that includes confi dential tax-return data for the whole population of German fi rms in 1998 and 2001. To identify the strategic consolidation decision, we use an exogenous variation in the German tax law that came into effect in January 2001 and reduced the costs of excluding affi liates from the consolidated group under the German local business tax system. Our empirical results confi rm our theoretical prediction, and suggest that an increase in the variation of tax rates within a corporate group by one standard deviation reduces the growth rate of the number of consolidated affi liates by around 20 percent. This fi nding is stable for a large set of specifi cations and robustness checks.
The paper thus indicates that MJEs tend to strategically exclude affi liates from consolidation under FA taxation in order to preserve profi t-shifting opportunities within the multi-jurisdictional group. However, if profi t-shifting channels to unconsolidated group affi liates remain open, this may -at least to some extent -undermine the effectiveness of the FA system in eliminating profi t-shifting activities. Since anecdotal and empirical evidence suggest that MJEs have greater fl exibility in transfering income to low-tax jurisdictions under SA than under FA (mainly because the latter requires changes in the real economic activities captured by the apportionment formula rather than the shifting of paper profi ts required under SA), the non-consolidation option may cause additional welfare losses under the FA regime. For instance, in a tax competition setting, the jurisdictions' incentives for a detrimental race-to-the-bottom in tax rates may be aggravated if fi rms decide against consolidation. 26 Thus, a direct policy implication of our paper is that the design of FA regimes should try to minimize the possibility that consolidated groups can exclude affi liates. Otherwise MJEs will tend to leave affi liates in low-tax jurisdictions unconsolidated and engage in profi t-shifting activities, despite the existence of a FA regime. In practical terms, this suggests that FA regimes should set the ownership participation threshold above which affi liates must be consolidated within multi-jurisdictional groups as low as possible; this will result in the inclusion of the maximum number of affi liates in the consolidated group, and make strategic non-consolidation more costly for the MJE. Moreover, emphasis should be placed on the defi nition of economic and organizational criteria for the consolidation of group affi liates, since this further restricts the MJE's latitude to alter its group structure compared to a situation where the rules for consolidation are based only -or primarily -on legal status. Hence, with regard to the currently debated design of a CCCTB in the European Union, our analysis suggests that the European Commission should regard manipulation of the group structure as a serious threat to the effectiveness of an FA regime in curbing tax planning, and should opt for a group defi nition that ensures that tax-motivated manipulations of group structure are costly for MJEs. To underpin this policy recommendation, the German case again offers an interesting example. After a series of reforms that have relaxed the rules for consolidation, starting with the reform analyzed in this paper, tax authorities faced increasing problems in limiting profi t shifting at the sub-national level, despite the implementation of FA. As a result, in 2004, federal legislation in Germany resorted to defi ning a minimum tax rate for the local business tax.
